Vienna, September 12, 2026. In July of this year, China founded the World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organization (WAICO) in Shanghai, a new international institution intended to help shape standards, rules, and partnerships for the use of Artificial Intelligence. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
The initiative fits into a larger pattern: both Beijing and Washington are increasingly positioning themselves as providers of competing technological ecosystems, from semiconductor supply chains to AI models to international regulatory frameworks. For Europe, which has neither the computing capacity of the USA nor China's state-coordinated industrial policy in either area, the question of its own positioning arises anew.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The WAICO joins already existing international forums such as the UN-supported AI dialogues and the US-dominated standardization bodies in chip design and cloud infrastructure. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
China is pursuing an approach that strategically offers technology transfer and training programs to developing countries, similar to the logic of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which since 2013 has facilitated infrastructure projects for over 150 countries with a total volume estimated at around one trillion US dollars. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
The USA, by contrast, relies on export controls for advanced semiconductors, such as through the tightened regulations of the US Department of Commerce against Chinese chip manufacturers in October 2022. Both approaches aim to shape technological standards and thus also economic dependencies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Behind the diplomatic facade lies a concrete industrial race. According to statements from China's Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, China invested around 140 billion US dollars in 2025 in the domestic expansion of AI computing infrastructure, while Taiwanese contract manufacturers such as TSMC continue to hold a market share of over 60 percent in advanced processor chips. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
SMIC, China's largest chip manufacturer, was able to produce 7-nanometer chips on a larger scale for the first time in 2025, but remains dependent on foreign equipment for the most advanced manufacturing processes below 3 nanometers, such as from Dutch ASML. These mutual dependencies also shape the European debate on the European Chips Act, which aims for a global market share of 20 percent in semiconductors by 2030.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The EU Commission is pursuing with the AI Act, which is being implemented step by step since August 2024, a third regulatory path that differs from both Chinese and US approaches. At the same time, Europe remains dependent in practical application on technology from both regions, such as graphics processors from Nvidia or language models based on Chinese open-source models like DeepSeek. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
Austrian research institutions, including the Institute of Science and Technology Austria (ISTA) and TU Wien, cooperate in individual AI research projects with both US and Chinese universities, without this so far allowing for a clear foreign policy determination by Austria.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
For European and Austrian companies, this constellation gives rise to concrete practical questions: Infineon in Villach, for example, supplies both Chinese and US customers with power semiconductors and is thus directly affected by export controls from both sides. The Austrian sensor and semiconductor manufacturer ams OSRAM sources pre-products from Asian supply chains, while domestic software companies increasingly face the decision of which AI models to base their applications on. The Austrian Chamber of Commerce valued foreign trade with China in 2025 at a volume of approximately 13.8 billion euros, a decline compared to the previous year, which is partly attributed to global supply chain shifts.<\/p>\n\n\n\n